The Economics of Bank Regulation
The authors review the economics of bank regulation as developed in the contemporary literature. They begin with an examination of the central aspects of modern banking theories in explaining the asset transformation function of intermediaries, optimal bank liability contracts, coordination problems leading to bank failures and their empirical significance, and the regulatory interventions suggested by these considerations. In particular, the authors focus on regulations aimed primarily at ameliorating deposit-insurance-related moral hazards, such as: cash-asset reserve requirements, risk-sensitive capital requirements and deposit insurance premia, and bank closure policy. Moreover, they examine the impact of the competitive environment (bank charter value) and industry structure (scope of banks) on these moral hazards. They also examine the implications of banking theory for alternatives to deposit insurance.
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|Date of creation:||1995|
|Date of revision:|
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