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Banking Crises: A Review

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  • Luc Laeven

    () (Research Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 20431
    Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, EC1V 3PZ, United Kingdom)

Abstract

This review surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the causes and consequences of banking crises, and summarizes the lessons learned from policy interventions to resolve banking crises. Despite their different origins, banking crises display similar patterns. Their causes lie in unsustainable macroeconomic policies, market failures, regulatory distortions, and government interference in the allocation of capital; they are frequently characterized by boom-bust cycles in credit and asset prices; and they are generally resolved through large-scale government intervention. When not handled effectively and swiftly, banking crises tend to impose enormous costs to society by curtailing the flow of credit to the real economy. The article concludes with a review of proposals to enhance financial stability in an increasingly integrated financial system, which include making banking regulation more macroprudential—focusing on the cycle and systemic risk rather than the risk of individual banks—and improving market discipline by limiting explicit and implicit government insurance of bank liabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Laeven, 2011. "Banking Crises: A Review," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 17-40, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:refeco:v:3:y:2011:p:17-40
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    2. Mikhail Stolbov, 2015. "Anatomy of international banking crises at the onset of the Great Recession," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 553-569, October.
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    6. Adelino, Manuel & Dinc, I. Serdar, 2014. "Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 256-272.
    7. Chouchène, Mabrouk & Ftiti, Zied & Khiari, Wided, 2017. "Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PB), pages 940-950.
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    9. Ross Levine & Chen Lin & Wensi Xie, 2016. "Corporate Resilience to Banking Crises: The Roles of Trust and Trade Credit," NBER Working Papers 22153, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. zhang, zhichao & Xie, Li & lu, xiangyun & zhang, zhuang, 2014. "Determinants of financial distress in u.s. large bank holding companies," MPRA Paper 53545, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Wolfgang Pointner & Katharina Wolner-Rößlhuber, 2011. "European Financial Supervision: The Long Road to Reform," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 62-81.
    12. Ho, Po-Hsin & Huang, Chia-Wei & Lin, Chih-Yung & Yen, Ju-Fang, 2016. "CEO overconfidence and financial crisis: Evidence from bank lending and leverage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 194-209.

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    Keywords

    financial crisis; financial stability; financial institutions; banking regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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