Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises
In: Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises. Copyright The American Finance Association 2001.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|This chapter was published in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.) Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, , chapter 5, pages 143-174, 2002.|
|This item is provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series with number v03c05pp143-174.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (562) 670 2000
Fax: (562) 698 4847
Web page: http://www.bcentral.cl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 1996. "Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 311-325.
- Park, Sangkyun, 1995. "Market discipline by depositors: Evidence from reduced-form equations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(35), pages 497-514.
- Charles W. Calormiris & Berry Wilson, 1998.
"Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930's Capital Crunch and Scramble to Shed Risk,"
NBER Working Papers
6649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, 1996. "Bank capital and portfolio management: the 1930s capital crunch and scramble to shed risk," Proceedings 521, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 1994.
"Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic,"
NBER Working Papers
4934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Calomiris, Charles W & Mason, Joseph R, 1997. "Contagion and Bank Failures during the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 863-83, December.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 1995. "Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression: the June 1932 Chicago banking panic," Proceedings 451, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Timothy H. Hannan & Gerald A. Hanweck, 1986.
"Bank insolvency risk and the market for large certificates of deposit,"
Working Papers in Banking, Finance and Microeconomics
86-1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May.
- Salvador Valdés & Alejandra Lomakin, 1988. "Percepción sobre la Garantía Estatal a los Depósitos Durante 1987 en Chile," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 25(75), pages 229-246.
- Ellis, David M. & Flannery, Mark J., 1992. "Does the debt market assess large banks, risk? : Time series evidence from money center CDs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 481-502, December.
- Cook, Douglas O & Spellman, Lewis J, 1994. "Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 439-59, August.
- Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
- Avery, Robert B & Belton, Terrence M & Goldberg, Michael A, 1988. "Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 597-610, November.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
- Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. " Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-77, September.
- Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2001. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 147-196 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-28, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v03c05pp143-174. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudio Sepulveda)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.