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Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99

In: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't

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  • Charles W. Calomiris
  • Andrew Powell

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Suggested Citation

  • Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2001. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99," NBER Chapters,in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 147-196 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10760
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10760.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    2. Önder, Zeynep & Özyildirim, Süheyla, 2008. "Market Reaction to Risky Banks: Did Generous Deposit Guarantee Change It?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1415-1435, August.
    3. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 804-819.
    4. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:404-421 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Cubillas, Elena & Fernández, Ana I. & González, Francisco, 2017. "How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 46-67.
    6. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
    7. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    8. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    9. Berger, Allen N. & Bouwman, Christa H.S., 2013. "How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 146-176.
    10. Jaremski, Matthew & Rousseau, Peter L., 2018. "The dawn of an ‘age of deposits’ in the United States," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 264-281.
    11. Barajas, Adolfo & Catalán, Mario, 2015. "Market discipline and conflicts of interest between banks and pension funds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 411-440.
    12. Caprio, Gerard & Honohan, Patrick, 2001. "Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World," MPRA Paper 9929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Hou, Xiaohui & Gao, Zhixian & Wang, Qing, 2016. "Internet finance development and banking market discipline: Evidence from China," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 88-100.
    14. Adolfo Barajas & Mario Catalan, 2011. "Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds," IMF Working Papers 11/282, International Monetary Fund.

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