Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99
In: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't
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- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999.
"A Theory of Bank Capital,"
NBER Working Papers
7431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
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