Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises
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- Chatterji, Shurojit & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2010. "Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 27, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Chatterji, S. & Ghosal, S., 2013. "Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-85, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
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More about this item
Keywords
bank runs; contagion; moral hazard; liquidity; random; contracts; monitoring.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2013-12-06 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-12-06 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2013-12-06 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-MAC-2013-12-06 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2013-12-06 (Monetary Economics)
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