IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rug/rugwps/12-781.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political connections and depositor discipline

Author

Listed:
  • M. DISLI
  • K. SCHOORS
  • J. MEIR

Abstract

We analyze how political connections affect depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician’s party is currently in power, but less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to depart with them.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Disli & K. Schoors & J. Meir, 2012. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/781, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:12/781
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://wps-feb.ugent.be/Papers/wp_12_781.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sironi, Andrea, 2003. "Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-472, June.
    2. Thomas Mondschean & Timothy Opiela, 1999. "Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 15(3), pages 179-196, May.
    3. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
    4. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R, 2001. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 179-198, April.
    5. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. "Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-1377, September.
    6. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    7. Douglas Evanoff & Larry Wall, 2001. "Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 121-145, October.
    8. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 2002. "Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 263-274, February.
    9. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    10. Olivier De Jonghe & Mustafa Disli & Koen Schoors, 2012. "Corporate Governance, Opaque Bank Activities, and Risk/Return Efficiency: Pre- and Post-Crisis Evidence from Turkey," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 51-80, April.
    11. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 1995. "Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 115-132, July.
    12. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
    13. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2009. "Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2331-2360, June.
    14. Michael J. Cooper & Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 687-724, April.
    15. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
    16. Park, Sangkyun, 1995. "Market discipline by depositors: Evidence from reduced-form equations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(35), pages 497-514.
    17. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Saffar, Walid, 2008. "Political connections of newly privatized firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 654-673, December.
    18. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    19. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 407-438, July.
    20. Önder, Zeynep & Özyildirim, Süheyla, 2008. "Market Reaction to Risky Banks: Did Generous Deposit Guarantee Change It?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1415-1435, August.
    21. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Jan De Dreu & Vasso P. Ioannidou, 2005. "The impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline," Proceedings 992, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    23. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December.
    24. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-364, August.
    25. Vella, Francis & Verbeek, Marno, 1999. "Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored endogenous variables and selection bias," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 239-263, June.
    26. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2001. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 147-196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Salamon, Lester M. & Siegfried, John J., 1977. "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 1026-1043, September.
    28. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    29. Başak Tanyeri, 2010. "Financial Transparency and Sources of Hidden Capital in Turkish Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 25-43, February.
    30. Laeven, Luc & Valencia, Fabián, 2012. "The use of blanket guarantees in banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1220-1248.
    31. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2009_007 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    33. Sebastian Schich, 2009. "Financial crisis: Deposit insurance and related financial safety net aspects," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(2), pages 1-39.
    34. Prean, Nora & Stix, Helmut, 2011. "The effect of raising deposit insurance coverage in times of financial crisis – Evidence from Croatian microdata," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 496-511.
    35. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    36. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    37. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-211, May.
    38. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    39. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    40. Hadi Salehi Esfahani, 1996. "Institutional Structure, Government Policy and Economic Performance in Turkey," Working Papers 9620, Economic Research Forum, revised 07 Nov 1996.
    41. Ioannidou, V. & de Dreu, J., 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," Other publications TiSEM 693cfa2c-76f1-4304-872f-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    42. repec:zbw:bofitp:2010_008 is not listed on IDEAS
    43. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    44. Jose Manuel Campa & Simi Kedia, 2002. "Explaining the Diversification Discount," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1731-1762, August.
    45. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
    46. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 949-995, October.
    47. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    48. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174, Central Bank of Chile.
    49. Douglas Cook & Lewis Spellman, 1994. "Firm and Guarantor Risk, Risk Contagion and the Interfirm Spread Among Insured Deposits," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-18, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    50. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
    51. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2013. "Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 179-200, February.
    52. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian, 2009. "Political connections and the process of going public: Evidence from China," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 696-719, June.
    53. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2010. "How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 36-61, January.
    54. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2009. "The Effect of Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline:Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0905, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    55. Mr. Adolfo Barajas & Mr. Roberto Steiner, 2000. "Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia," IMF Working Papers 2000/214, International Monetary Fund.
    56. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
    57. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ho, Po-Hsin & Chen, Hung-Kun & Lin, Chih-Yung & Chi, Che-Wei, 2016. "Does monitoring by the media improve the performance of government banks?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 76-87.
    2. Papadimitri, Panagiota & Pasiouras, Fotios & Pescetto, Gioia & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2021. "Does political influence distort banking regulation? Evidence from the US," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    3. Michael G. Arghyrou & Maria Dolores Gadea, 2019. "Private bank deposits and macro/fiscal risk in the euro-area," CESifo Working Paper Series 7532, CESifo.
    4. Anna Mishura & Svetlana Ageeva, 2016. "Regional distribution of bank institutions in Russia: Role of state and education," ERSA conference papers ersa16p167, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Trinugroho, Irwan & Pamungkas, Putra & Ariefianto, Mochammad Doddy & Tarazi, Amine, 2020. "Deposit structure, market discipline, and ownership type: Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(2).
    6. Ahmet F. Aysan & Mustafa Disli & Meryem Duygun & Huseyin Ozturk, 2017. "Islamic Banks, Deposit Insurance Reform, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 257-282, April.
    7. Delis, Manthos D. & Staikouras, Panagiotis K. & Tsoumas, Chris, 2019. "Supervisory enforcement actions and bank deposits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 110-123.
    8. Nguyen, Thach V.H. & Nguyen, Thai Vu Hong, 2022. "How do banks price liquidity? The role of market power," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    9. M. Disli & K. Schoors, 2013. "Bank rebranding and depositor loyalty," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 13/867, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    10. Rihem Braham & Lotfi Belkacem & Christian de Peretti, 2018. "The role of political patronage on risk-taking behavior of banks in Middle East and North Africa region," Working Papers hal-01762523, HAL.
    11. Maria Semenova & Andrey Shapkin, 2019. "Currency Shifts as a Market Discipline Device: The Case of the Russian Market for Personal Deposits," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(10), pages 2149-2163, August.
    12. Nys, Emmanuelle & Tarazi, Amine & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2015. "Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 83-104.
    13. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Podgórski, Błażej & Winkler-Drews, Tadeusz, 2020. "Do political connections shield from negative shocks? Evidence from rating changes in advanced emerging economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    14. Alexander Benov & Maria Semenova, 2021. "Bank Runs And Media Freedom: What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 81/FE/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Aydemir, Resul & Guloglu, Bulent, 2017. "How do banks determine their spreads under credit and liquidity risks during business cycles?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 147-157.
    16. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 804-819.
    17. Rihem Braham & Christian Peretti & Lotfi Belkacem, 2019. "Do political connections affect bank leverage? Evidence from some Middle Eastern and North African countries," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(4), pages 989-1006, December.
    18. Mustafa Disli & Koen Schoors, 2019. "The Dynamic Effects Of Bank Rebranding And Familiarity Bias," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 19/955, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    19. Schoors, Koen & Semenova, Maria & Zubanov, Andrey, 2019. "Depositor discipline during crisis: Flight to familiarity or trust in local authorities?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 25-39.
    20. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Aysan, Ahmet F. & Disli, Mustafa & Ng, Adam & Ozturk, Huseyin, 2016. "Is small the new big? Islamic banking for SMEs in Turkey," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 187-194.
    22. Ahmet F. Aysan & Mustafa Disli & Huseyin Ozturk & Ibrahim M. Turhan, 2015. "Are Islamic Banks Subject To Depositor Discipline?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(01), pages 1-16.
    23. Omneya Abdelsalam & Sabur Mollah & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2018. "Political connection and bank in(efficiency)," Working Papers 2018-11, Swansea University, School of Management.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:zbw:bofitp:2013_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 804-819.
    3. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2013, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    4. M. Disli & K. Schoors, 2013. "Bank rebranding and depositor loyalty," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 13/867, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    5. Emmanuelle Nys & Amine Tarazi & Irwan Trinugroho, 2013. "Political Connections, Bank Deposits, and Formal Deposit Insurance: Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Working Papers hal-00916513, HAL.
    6. Ahmet F. Aysan & Mustafa Disli & Huseyin Ozturk & Ibrahim M. Turhan, 2015. "Are Islamic Banks Subject To Depositor Discipline?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 60(01), pages 1-16.
    7. Nys, Emmanuelle & Tarazi, Amine & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2015. "Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 83-104.
    8. Su, Zhong-qin & Fung, Hung-Gay & Huang, Deng-shi & Shen, Chung-Hua, 2014. "Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 260-272.
    9. Ahmet F. Aysan & Mustafa Disli & Meryem Duygun & Huseyin Ozturk, 2017. "Islamic Banks, Deposit Insurance Reform, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 257-282, April.
    10. Feng, Xunan & Johansson, Anders C. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2015. "Mixing business with politics: Political participation by entrepreneurs in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 220-235.
    11. Allen Berger & Rima Turk-Ariss, 2015. "Do Depositors Discipline Banks and Did Government Actions During the Recent Crisis Reduce this Discipline? An International Perspective," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 103-126, October.
    12. Zhong-qin Su & Hung-Gay Fung, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 283-317, August.
    13. Chung-Hua Shen & Chih-Yung Lin, 2016. "Political connections, financial constraints, and corporate investment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 343-368, August.
    14. Daeheon Choi & Chune Young Chung & Soon-Ihl Samuel Hong & Jason Young, 2020. "The Role of Political Collusion in Corporate Performance in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-18, March.
    15. Barraza, Santiago & Rossi, Martín A & Ruzzier, Christian A, 2022. "Sleeping with the enemy: The perils of having the government on(the)board," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 641-651.
    16. Chune Young Chung & Jung Hoon Byun & Jason Young, 2019. "Corporate Political Ties and Firm Value: Comparative Analysis in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-25, January.
    17. Wang, Fangjun & Xu, Luying & Zhang, Junrui & Shu, Wei, 2018. "Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 53-67.
    18. Li, Guoping & Zhou, Hong, 2015. "Political connections and access to IPO markets in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 76-93.
    19. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2013. "Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5436-5451.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/65rged1j6o9gl9jvp8a09o3eue is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Quoc-Anh Do & Yen-Teik Lee & Bang Dang Nguyen, 2013. "Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections," Working Papers hal-03460972, HAL.
    22. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n0dcia0po is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Javier Gómez‐Biscarri & Germán López‐Espinosa & Andrés Mesa‐Toro, 2022. "Drivers of depositor discipline in credit unions," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(4), pages 849-885, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Depositor Discipline; Political connections; Banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:12/781. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ferugbe.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nathalie Verhaeghe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ferugbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.