IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v80y2006i2p385-417.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?

Author

Listed:
  • Villalonga, Belen
  • Amit, Raphael

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:80:y:2006:i:2:p:385-417
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(05)00115-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
    2. Cronqvist, Henrik & Nilsson, Mattias, 2003. "Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 695-719, December.
    3. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 51-64.
    4. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    6. Luigi Zingales, 1995. "What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1047-1073.
    7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    8. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1997. "Industry costs of equity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 153-193, February.
    10. Randall Morck & David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease?," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 319-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    12. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 159-184, March.
    13. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 2000. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 295-318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Dynastic Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, January.
    15. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    16. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    17. Smith, Brian F. & Amoako-Adu, Ben, 1999. "Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 341-368, December.
    18. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    19. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    20. Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J. & Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1983. "The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 439-471, April.
    21. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    22. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    24. Paul A. Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2004. "Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies," NBER Working Papers 10240, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    26. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    27. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    28. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    29. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    30. repec:hrv:faseco:30747196 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    2. Saito, Takuji, 2008. "Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 620-646, December.
    3. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    4. Nhung Hong LE, 2017. "The impact of family ownership status on determinants of leverage. Empirical evidence from South East Asia," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-09, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    5. Pindado, Julio & Requejo, Ignacio & de la Torre, Chabela, 2014. "Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 58-74.
    6. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan : Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," Governance Working Papers 22830, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    8. Grosfeld, Irena, 2009. "Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 259-277, September.
    9. Lionel Almeida, 2015. "Who are the controlling shareholders? Degree and seniority of control, and CEO pay monitoring," Working Papers hal-02102813, HAL.
    10. Taylan Mavruk & Conny Overland & Stefan Sjögren, 2020. "Keeping it real or keeping it simple? Ownership concentration measures compared," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 958-1005, September.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. San Martin-Reyna, J.M. & Duran-Encalada, Jorge A., 2012. "The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 106-117.
    13. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    14. Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Lester, Richard H. & Cannella Jr., Albert A., 2007. "Are family firms really superior performers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 829-858, December.
    15. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pombo, Carlos & Trujillo, María-Andrea, 2012. "Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 626-649.
    16. Wenyi Chu, 2011. "Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 833-851, December.
    17. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    18. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    19. Luis H. Gutiérrez & Carlos Pombo, 2005. "Corporate Valuation and Governance: Evidence from Colombia," Research Department Publications 3216, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    20. Edwards, Jeremy S.S. & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2009. "Control rights, pyramids, and the measurement of ownership concentration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 489-508, October.
    21. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2008. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 579-604, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:80:y:2006:i:2:p:385-417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.