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A survey of blockholders and corporate control

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  • Clifford G. Holderness

Abstract

The author surveys the empirical literature on large-percentage shareholders in public corporations, focusing on four key issues: the prevalence of blockholders; the motivation for block ownership; the effect of blockholders on executive compensation, leverage, the incidence of takeovers, and a wide range of corporate decisions; and the effect of blockholders on firm value. A central finding of this study is that there is little reason for policymakers or small investors to fear large-percentage shareholders in general, especially when the blockholders are active in firm management.

Suggested Citation

  • Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 51-64.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2003:i:apr:p:51-64:n:v.9no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," NBER Working Papers 7604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," Working Papers 810, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Stockholders;

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