IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Political connections and depositor discipline

  • Disli, Mustafa
  • Schoors, Koen
  • Meir, Jos

We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power – less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1572308913000399
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Stability.

Volume (Year): 9 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 804-819

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:9:y:2013:i:4:p:804-819
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfstabil

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Flannery, Mark J & Sorescu, Sorin M, 1996. " Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1347-77, September.
  2. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
  3. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
  4. Roberto Steiner & Adolfo Barajas, 2000. "Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia," IMF Working Papers 00/214, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Jose Manuel Campa & Simi Kedia, 2002. "Explaining the Diversification Discount," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1731-1762, 08.
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2003. "Unbundling Institutions," NBER Working Papers 9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Vella, F. & Verbeek, M.J.C.M., 1999. "Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored endogenous variables and selection bias," Other publications TiSEM 5aad87bc-25d1-49bc-882b-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  8. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
  9. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2001. "Sub-debt yield spreads as bank risk measures," Working Paper Series WP-01-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  10. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & Hudgins, Sylvia C., 2002. "Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 263-274, February.
  11. Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, 2001. "Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia," NBER Working Papers 8521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
  13. O. De Jonghe & M. Disli & K. Schoors, 2011. "Corporate governance, opaque bank activities, and risk/return efficiency: Pre- and post-crisis evidence from Turkey," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 11/729, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  14. Francis , Bill B & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sun, Xian, 2009. "Political connections and the process of going public: evidence from China," Research Discussion Papers 7/2009, Bank of Finland.
  15. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
  16. Karas, Alexei & Pyle, William & Schoors, Koen, 2010. "The effect of deposit insurance on market discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows," BOFIT Discussion Papers 8/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  17. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, 2008. "The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 08/250, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Joachim Voth & Thomas Ferguson, 2008. "Betting on Hitler: The value of political connections in Nazi Germany," Economics Working Papers 1183, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  19. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2010. "How do Russian depositors discipline their banks? Evidence of a backward bending deposit supply function," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 36-61, January.
  20. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2007. "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 330-357, May.
  21. Douglas Cook & Lewis Spellman, 1994. "Firm and Guarantor Risk, Risk Contagion and the Interfirm Spread Among Insured Deposits," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-18, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  22. Park, Sangkyun, 1995. "Market discipline by depositors: Evidence from reduced-form equations," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(35), pages 497-514.
  23. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
  24. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3849, The World Bank.
  25. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2013. "Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 179-200, 02.
  26. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
  27. Prean, Nora & Stix, Helmut, 2011. "The effect of raising deposit insurance coverage in times of financial crisis – Evidence from Croatian microdata," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 496-511.
  28. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
  29. Önder, Zeynep & Özyildirim, Süheyla, 2008. "Market Reaction to Risky Banks: Did Generous Deposit Guarantee Change It?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1415-1435, August.
  30. Vella, Francis & Verbeek, Marno, 1999. "Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored endogenous variables and selection bias," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 239-263, June.
  31. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  32. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
  33. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R, 2001. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 179-98, April.
  34. Andrea Sironi, 2000. "Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-40, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  35. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2001. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 147-196 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
  37. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
  39. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December.
  40. Sebastian Schich, 2008. "Financial crisis: Deposit insurance and related financial safety net aspects," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(2), pages 1-39.
  41. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Saffar, Walid, 2008. "Political connections of newly privatized firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 654-673, December.
  42. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 1995. "Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 115-132, July.
  43. Vasso Ioannidou & Jan de Dreu, 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," DNB Working Papers 089, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  44. Laeven, Luc & Valencia, Fabián, 2012. "The use of blanket guarantees in banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1220-1248.
  45. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May.
  46. Thomas S. Mondschean & Timothy P. Opiela, 1998. "Bank time deposit rates and market discipline in Poland: the impact of state ownership and deposit insurance reform," Working Paper Series WP-98-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  47. Michael J. Cooper & Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 687-724, 04.
  48. M. Disli & K. Schoors & J. Meir, 2012. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/781, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  49. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  50. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411, November.
  51. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
  52. repec:dgr:kubcen:20065 is not listed on IDEAS
  53. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2007. "Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6045, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  54. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-61, January.
  55. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80344 is not listed on IDEAS
  56. Başak Tanyeri, 2010. "Financial Transparency and Sources of Hidden Capital in Turkish Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 25-43, February.
  57. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2009. "Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2331-2360, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:9:y:2013:i:4:p:804-819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.