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Introduction to Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation

In: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Charles Rochet

    (University of Toulouse, London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world’s leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? , he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Introduction to Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation," Introductory Chapters,in: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation Princeton University Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:pup:chapts:8660-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiarella, Carl & Flaschel, Peter & Hartmann, Florian & Proaño, Christian R., 2012. "Stock market booms, endogenous credit creation and the implications of broad and narrow banking for macroeconomic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 410-423.
    2. Thakor, Anjan V., 2012. "Incentives to innovate and financial crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 130-148.
    3. Antunes, António & Bonfim, Diana & Monteiro, Nuno & Rodrigues, Paulo M.M., 2018. "Forecasting banking crises with dynamic panel probit models," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 249-275.
    4. Claudia M. Buch & Sandra Eickmeier & Esteban Prieto, 2014. "Macroeconomic Factors and Microlevel Bank Behavior," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(4), pages 715-751, June.
    5. Buch, Claudia M. & Koetter, Michael & Ohls, Jana, 2016. "Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-15.
    6. Jorge Ponce, 2010. "A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 141-181, July-Dece.
    7. Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, 2009. "Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 2640, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Jianxing Wei & Tong Xu, 2018. "A Model of Bank Credit Cycles," 2018 Meeting Papers 610, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Leif Atle Beisland & Roy Mersland & R. Oystein Strøm, 2012. "Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry," Working Papers CEB 12-034, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    10. Arnold, Eva A. & Größl, Ingrid & Koziol, Philipp, 2016. "Market discipline across bank governance models: Empirical evidence from German depositors," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 126-138.
    11. Olivier de Bandt & Jean-Cyprien Héam & Claire Labonne & Santiago Tavolaro, 2015. "La mesure du risque systémique après la crise financière," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 66(3), pages 481-500.
    12. Thakor, Anjan V., 2016. "The highs and the lows: A theory of credit risk assessment and pricing through the business cycle," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-29.
    13. Jacopo Carmassi & Stefano Micossi, 2012. "Time to Set Banking Regulation Right," FMG Special Papers sp206, Financial Markets Group.
    14. repec:bpj:zfbrbw:v:28:y:2016:i:6:p:427-444:n:8 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Armen Hovakimian & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2013," NBER Working Papers 18043, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Kotz Hans-Helmut & Schmidt Reinhard H., 2016. "Corporate Governance of Banks – A German Alternative to the Standard Model," Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (ZBB) / Journal of Banking Law and Banking (JBB), RWS Verlag, vol. 28(6), pages 427-444, December.
    17. Divya Kirti, 2017. "When Gambling for Resurrection is Too Risky," IMF Working Papers 17/180, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Paul Glasserman & Wanmo Kang, 2014. "Design of Risk Weights," Working Papers 14-06, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    19. Martin Byford & Sinclair Davidson, 2013. "Informing Depositors: A Proposed Reform Of The Australian Banking Sector," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 32(4), pages 417-425, December.
    20. Luc Laeven, 2011. "Banking Crises: A Review," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 17-40, December.
    21. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2018. "Regulatory Competition in Banking: A General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 12791, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. repec:bla:ecopol:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:179-208 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. APATACHIOAE, Adina, 2014. "Free Banking – Possible Solution To The Recent Crisis?," Journal of Financial and Monetary Economics, Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 1(1), pages 66-72.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking crises; bank regulation; deposit insurance; globalization;

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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