IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

An overall perspective on banking regulation

  • Xavier Freixas
  • Anthony M. Santomero

Recently, the theory of banking regulation has undergone important changes. This has been the consequence of a number of compounding effects that have been occurring in the financial sector. First among these is on-going financial innovation, which has caused a virtual revolution in both financial instruments and markets. As a result, the markets and institutions that must be regulated have changed substantially over time. At the same time, regulation has evolved, as the regulators have learned the lessons from the recent spat of banking crises. As a consequence of these experiences, regulation has become more sophisticated, with the introduction of capital requirements and more complex restrictions on operating procedures.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-1.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 02-1.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:02-1
Contact details of provider: Postal: 10 Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
Web page: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/wps/index.html Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Kathleen A. Kuester & James M. O'Brien, 1990. "Market-based deposit insurance premiums," Proceedings 264, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  2. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Working Paper 88-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-64, July.
  4. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  5. George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester, 1993. "A positive analysis of bank closure," Working Papers 94-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  6. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 1984. "Banking Panics," Discussion Papers 618, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Freixas, Xavier & Gabillon, Emmanuelle, 1999. "Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 111-34, September.
  8. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, June.
  9. De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic risk: A survey," Working Paper Series 0035, European Central Bank.
  10. Anthony M. Santomero & Jeffrey J. Trester, 1997. "Structuring Deposit Insurance for a United Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 3(2), pages 135-154.
  11. Flannery, Mark J, 1996. "Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 804-24, November.
  12. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, 1991. "A quality and risk-adjusted cost function for banks: evidence on the " too-big-to-fail" doctrine," Working Papers 91-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  13. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  14. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
  15. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. " Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
  16. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. " Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 227-45, March.
  17. Rafael Repullo, 2000. "Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
  18. Huang, H. & Xu, C., 2000. "Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises," Papers 21, Chicago - Graduate School of Business.
  19. Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 415-32, July.
  20. Gary Gorton, 1986. "Banking panics and business cycles," Working Papers 86-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  21. Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, 1996. "The efficiency of self-regulated payments systems: learning from the Suffolk System," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 766-803.
  22. George Pennacchi & Gary Gorton, . "Security Baskets and Index-Linked Securities," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 29-89, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  23. Fama, Eugene F., 1980. "Banking in the theory of finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 39-57, January.
  24. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Schmeits, Anjolein, 2000. "Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Firms with Applications to Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 240-273, July.
  25. Campbell, Tim S & Kracaw, William A, 1980. " Information Production, Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(4), pages 863-82, September.
  26. William F. Sharpe, 1977. "Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values, Part I," NBER Working Papers 0209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Giammarino, Ronald M & Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1993. " An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1523-42, September.
  28. Miron, Jeffrey A, 1986. "Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and theFounding of the Fed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 125-40, March.
  29. Slovin, Myron B. & Sushka, Marie E. & Polonchek, John A., 1999. "An analysis of contagion and competitive effects at commercial banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 197-225, October.
  30. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, . "Optimal Security Design," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 26-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  31. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  32. Berger, Allen N & Hancock, Diana & Marquardt, Jeffrey C, 1996. "A Framework for Analyzing Efficiency, Risks, Costs, and Innovations in the Payments System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 696-732, November.
  33. Koehn, Michael & Santomero, Anthony M, 1980. " Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1235-44, December.
  34. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  35. Kane, Edward J., 1995. "Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 431-459, June.
  36. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  37. Bhattacharya, S. & Boot, A.W.A. & Thakor, A.V., 1995. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Papers 9516, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  38. Mark L. Gertler, 1988. "Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview," NBER Working Papers 2559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. Arnoud W A Boot & Anjan V Thakor, 1992. "Security Design," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0020, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
  40. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  41. Robert Litan & William Isaac & William Taylor, 1994. "Financial Regulation," NBER Chapters, in: American Economic Policy in the 1980s, pages 519-572 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Sharpe, William F., 1978. "Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 701-718, November.
  43. S. Rao Aiyagari, 1988. "Banking panics, information, and rational expectations equilibrium," Working Papers 320, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  44. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
  45. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-12, May.
  46. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July.
  47. McCulloch, J Huston, 1986. "Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 79-85, January.
  48. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  49. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Deposit insurance reform in the FDIC Improvement Act: the experience to date," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 2-20.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:02-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beth Paul)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.