The paper explains why an issuer may wish to raise external capital by selling multiple financial claims that partition its total asset cash flows, rather than a single claim. It is shown that in an asymmetric information environment, the issuer's expected revenue is enhanced by such cash flow partitioning because it makes informed trade more profitable. This approach seems capable of shedding light on corporate incentives to issue debt and equity, as well as on financial intermediaries' incentives to issue multiple classes of claims against portfolios of securitized assets.
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|Date of creation:||Nov 1992|
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