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An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspective of regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justifications of financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failures that make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how the analysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrial organization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be part of banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.

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File URL: https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/664.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 664.

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Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:664
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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