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Odious Debt

  • Seema Jayachandran

Trade sanctions are often criticized as ineffective because they create incentives for evasion or as harmful to the target country's population. Loan sanctions, in contrast, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population from being saddled with "odious debt" run up by looting or repressive dictators. Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of countries' assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after sanctions were imposed. This would reduce creditors' incentives to lend to sanctioned regimes. Restricting sanctions to cover only loans made after the sanction was imposed would help avoid time-consistency problems.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Jayachandran/Jayachandran298.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 298.

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Date of creation: 15 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:298
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
  2. Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, 2002. "Odious Debt," NBER Working Papers 8953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, 1995. "Sovereign Debt," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 59, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  4. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Geoffrey Brennan & Giuseppe Eusepi, 2002. "The Dubious Ethics of Debt Default," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 546-561, November.
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