IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedawp/2001-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Private international debt with risk of repudiation

Author

Listed:
  • Karsten Jeske

Abstract

The risk of repudiation plays a central role in the size and nature of international capital flows. In this paper the author addresses the question of whether, in a world of international capital flows with risk of default, strategic externalities provide a rationale for regulation of international borrowing. The author models centralized arrangements of international debt in which only governments borrow and lend internationally and decentralized arrangements in which individuals have access to international markets. The author shows that a centralized setup allows more international risk sharing than a decentralized setup.

Suggested Citation

  • Karsten Jeske, 2005. "Private international debt with risk of repudiation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2001-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2001-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/wp/2001/wp0116a.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077, Elsevier.
    2. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-1089, July.
    3. Giovannetti, Giorgia & Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1993. "Growth, capital flows and enforcement constraints : The case of Africa," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 418-425, April.
    4. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1991. "Expropriation and direct investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 201-227, May.
    5. Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2000. "Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 775-798, July.
    6. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    7. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1984. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect Capital Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 16-40, March.
    8. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
    9. Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 1998. "Asset Pricing when Risk Sharing is Limited by Default," NBER Working Papers 6476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    11. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
    12. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(4), pages 865-888.
    13. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Guzman, Andrew T, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 775-808, October.
    14. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    15. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1992. "Two-sided expropriation and international equity contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 77-104, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
    2. Kehoe, Patrick J. & Perri, Fabrizio, 2004. "Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 184-206, November.
    3. Seon Tae Kim & Gabriel Mihalache & Yan Bai, 2014. "Maturity and Repayment Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2014 Meeting Papers 523, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Jaime Guajardo, 2004. "Financial Frictions and Business Cycles in Developing Countries," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 307, Econometric Society.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fernando Broner & Jaume Ventura, 2011. "Globalization and Risk Sharing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 49-82.
    2. Karsten Jeske, 2006. "Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 576-593, June.
    3. Yue, Vivian Z., 2010. "Sovereign default and debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 176-187, March.
    4. Cristina Arellano & Enrique Mendoza, 2002. "Fricciones crediticias y 'paradas repentinas' en pequeñas economías abiertas: un marco de equilibrio del ciclo económico para crisis en mercados emergentes," Research Department Publications 4308, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    5. Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
    6. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    7. Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
    8. Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
    9. Arellano, Cristina & Mendoza, Enrique G., 2002. "Credit Frictions and "Sudden Stop" in Small Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging Markets Crises," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1440, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Haichao Fan & Xiang Gao, 2017. "Domestic Creditor Rights and External Private Debt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2410-2440, November.
    11. Faria, Andr & Mauro, Paolo, 2009. "Institutions and the external capital structure of countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 367-391, April.
    12. Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina, 2019. "Endogenous borrowing constraints and stagnation in Latin America," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    13. Azariadis, Costas & Kaas, Leo, 2013. "Endogenous credit limits with small default costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 806-824.
    14. Cristina Arellano, 2005. "Default Risk, the Real Exchange Rate and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," 2005 Meeting Papers 516, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.
    16. Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha & Yiannis Vailakis, 2014. "Self-enforcing Debt, Reputation, and the Role of Interest Rates," Working Papers hal-01097114, HAL.
    17. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    18. V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha & Yiannis Vailakis, 2017. "On the sovereign debt paradox," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 825-846, December.
    19. Sergio Rebelo & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2018. "Rare Disasters, Financial Development, and Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 25031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Kohlscheen, E. & O'Connell, S. A., 2006. "A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and Reserves," Economic Research Papers 269636, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt; Risk; Capital movements; International finance;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2001-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rob Sarwark (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbatus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.