Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement
We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy, these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital, these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Karsten Jeske, 2005. "Private international debt with risk of repudiation," Working Paper 2001-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Baxter, Marianne & Crucini, Mario J, 1995.
"Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of Foreign Trade,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 821-54, November.
- Marianne Baxter & Mario J. Crucini, 1994. "Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of Foreign Trade," NBER Working Papers 4975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baxter, M. & Crucini, M., 1991. "Business Cycles and the Asset Structure of Foreign Trade," RCER Working Papers 316, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Marianne Baxter & Mario J. Crucini, 1992. "Business cycles and the asset structure of foreign trade," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 59, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Mark L. J. Wright, 2004.
"Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk,"
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
- Wright, Mark L.J., 2006. "Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 120-149, June.
- Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993.
"Debt Constrained Asset Markets,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1276, David K. Levine.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,"
- Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000.
"International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets,"
265, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2002. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 907-928, May.
- Patrick J. Kehoe & Fabrizio Perri, 2000. "International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 7870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989.
"Sustainable plans and mutual default,"
124, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002.
"Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
- Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 209-44, January.
- David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1991.
"International real business cycles,"
146, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 2001. "Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 575-98, May.
- V. V. Chari & Patrick J Kehoe, 1998.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
600, David K. Levine.
- Juha Ilmari Seppala, 2000.
"Asset Prices and Business Cycles Under Limited Commitment,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0244, Econometric Society.
- Juha Seppala, 2000. "Asset Prices And Business Cycles Under Limited Commitment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 319, Society for Computational Economics.
- Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June.
- Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010.
"Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2053, David K. Levine.
- Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:119:y:2004:i:1:p:184-206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.