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Public Insurance against Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk: The Case of Social Security and Progressive Income Taxation

  • Dirk Krueger

In this article, I discuss the role a progressive income tax system and a redistributive pay as you go (PAYGO) social security system can play in insuring and reallocating idiosyncratic as well as aggregate risk. I also argue that the underlying source of market failures generating such a role for government intervention may be crucial when determining the normative consequences of such social insurance. (JEL Classifications: E62, H21, H24, H55). Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifl015
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Article provided by CESifo in its journal CESifo Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 52 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 587-620

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Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:52:y:2006:i:4:p:587-620
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