IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply

  • Torben M. Andersen

    ()

    (School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

  • Joydeep Bhattacharya

    (Iowa State University, USA)

Abstract. A classic result in dynamic public economics, dating back to Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975), states that there is no welfare rationale for PAYG pensions in a dynamically-efficient neoclassical economy with exogenous labor supply. This paper argues that this result, under the fairly-mild restriction that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, extends to a neoclassical economy with endogenous labor supply.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.au.dk/afn/wp/09/wp09_16.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2009-16.

as
in new window

Length: 26
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2009-16
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Luisa Fuster & Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu, 2007. "Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 113-145.
  2. Nourry, C., 1998. "Stability of Equilibria in the Overlapping Generations Model with Endogenous Labor Supply," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a01, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  3. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467.
  4. repec:crr:crrwps:2004-07 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2008. "On Myopia as Rationale for Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 2401, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel, 2008. "On the role of public debt in an OLG model with endogenous labor supply," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1323-1328, September.
  7. Juan C. Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 1999. "Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 757-795, October.
  8. Christopher Otrok, 2000. "On Measuring the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1094, Econometric Society.
  9. Andrew B. Abel & N. Gregory Mankiw & Lawrence H. Summers & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1986. "Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834, June.
  11. Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2004. "Lessons for an ageing society: the political sustainability of social security systems," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 63-115, 04.
  12. Guido Cazzavillan & Patrick A. Pintus, 2004. "Robustness of Multiple Equilibria in OLG Economies," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(2), pages 456-475, April.
  13. Breyer, Friedrich & Straub, Martin, 1993. "Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems when labor supply is endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 77-91, January.
  14. Barbie Martin & Hagedorn Marcus & Kaul Ashok, 2004. "Assessing Aggregate Tests of Efficiency for Dynamic Economies," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17, December.
  15. Frank Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2013. "Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 375-401, July.
  16. Donald Meyer & Jack Meyer, 2005. "Relative Risk Aversion: What Do We Know?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 243-262, December.
  17. Dirk Krueger, 2006. "Public Insurance against Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk: The Case of Social Security and Progressive Income Taxation," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 52(4), pages 587-620, December.
  18. Homburg, Stefan, 1990. "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 640-647.
  19. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
  20. Samuelson, Paul A, 1975. "Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(3), pages 539-44, October.
  21. Martin Salm, 2010. "Subjective mortality expectations and consumption and saving behaviours among the elderly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 1040-1057, August.
  22. Heijdra, Ben J. & Mierau, Jochen O., 2010. "Growth Effects Of Consumption And Labor-Income Taxation In An Overlapping-Generations Life-Cycle Model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(S2), pages 151-175, November.
  23. Conesa, Juan Carlos & Garriga, Carlos, 2003. "Status Quo Problem In Social Security Reforms," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(05), pages 691-710, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2009-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.