A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights
Why do societies impose legal restrictions that limit the disposable property rights of some individuals? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against financial markets that, in a sense, work 'too well'. That is, we demonstrate how a well-functioning financial market can potentially work against a social policy designed to ensure a basic minimum standard of living for all types of individuals. Inalienable property rights emerge as a natural institutional response to the relatively improvident tendencies of some members of society when a majority of individuals share a common distaste for neighborhood squalor.
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|Date of creation:||Nov 1999|
|Date of revision:||Nov 1999|
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