Risk Sharing: Private Insurance Markets or Redistributive Taxes?
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- Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 1999. "Risk sharing: private insurance markets or redistributive taxes?," Staff Report 262, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Cited by:
- Dirk Kreuger & Fabrizio Perri, 2002.
"Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory,"
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- Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 2005. "Does income inequality lead to consumption equality? evidence and theory," Staff Report 363, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1661-1691, October.
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- Uhlig, Harald & Krueger, Dirk, 2005. "Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2005-003, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Uhlig, Harald & Krueger, Dirk, 2004. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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"Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(1), pages 151-181, February.
- Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 95, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Tim Worall & Jonathan P Thomas, 2005. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision," 2005 Meeting Papers 158, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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- Junsang Lee & Yili Chien, 2008. "Why Tax Capital?," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2008-497, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
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- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 11185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June.
- Lance Lochner & Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2002. "Human Capital Formation with Endogenous Credit Constraints," NBER Working Papers 8815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- YiLi Chien & JunSang Lee, 2006.
"Optimal Capital Taxation under Limited Commitment,"
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- Junsang Lee & Yili Chien, 2008. "Optimal Capital Taxation Under Limited Commitment," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2008-498, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Yili Chien & Junsang Lee, 2009. "Optimal capital taxation under limited commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2009-06, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Charles Grant, 2000. "Bankruptcy, Credit Constraints, and Insurance: Some Empirics," CSEF Working Papers 40, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús & Krueger, Dirk, 2011.
"Consumption And Saving Over The Life Cycle: How Important Are Consumer Durables?,"
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(5), pages 725-770, November.
- Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Dirk Krueger, 2004. "Consumption and Saving over the Life Cycle: How Important are Consumer Durables?," 2004 Meeting Papers 357b, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Athreya, Kartik B., 2002. "Welfare implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 1567-1595, November.
- Jon Strand, 2002. "Effects of Progressive Taxes under Decentralized Bargaining and Heterogeneous Labor," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 195-210, March.
- David Andolfatto, 2002.
"A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 382-393, April.
- David Andolfatto, 1999. "A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights," Working Papers 99004, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Nov 1999.
- David Andolfatto, 2000. "A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 110, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
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"Human Capital Investment and Debt Constraints,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(1), pages 52-67, January.
- David Andolfatto & Martin Gervais, 2004. "Human Capital Investment and Debt Constraints," Labor and Demography 0412006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Perri, Fabrizio & Krueger, Dirk, 2002. "Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3583, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Juan A. Rojas & Carlos Urrutia, 2008. "Social Security with Uninsurable Income Risk and Endogenous Borrowing Constraints," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 83-103, January.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2002.
"Informal Family Insurance And The Design Of The Welfare State,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 481-503, July.
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 1998. "Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State," JCPR Working Papers 44, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- DiTella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 1999. "Informal family insurance and the design of the welfare state," ZEI Working Papers B 23-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Juan Rojas & Carlos Urrutia, 2004.
"Social Security Reform with Uninsurable Income Risk and Endogenous Borrowing Constraints,"
Macroeconomics
0410010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Juan A. Rojas & Carlos Urrutia, 2006. "Social Security Reform with Uninsurable Income Risk and Endogenous Borrowing Constraints," Working Papers 0602, Banco de España.
- Juan A. Rojas & Carlos Urrutia, 2004. "Social Security Reform with Uninsurable Income Risk and Endogenous Borrowing Constraints," Working Papers 0409, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002.
"Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision,"
Keele Economics Research Papers
KERP 2002/20, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision," Public Economics 0211002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 2005. "The Research Agenda: Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri on Risk Sharing across Households, Generations and Countries," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), April.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2002. "Money: What's the Question and Why Should We Care About the Answer?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 58-61, May.
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