Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision
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- Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public vs Private Provision," Public Economics 0211002, EconWPA.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial Insurance; Moral Hazard; Limited Commitment; Unemployment Insurance; Crowding Out;
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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