Anonymity and individual risk
Adverse selection economies with private information are generally studied under the assumption that contracts are exclusive. That is, retrading is prohibited. An alternative market mechanism, the anonymous mechanism, is studied here. Risk averse agents trade contingent claims directly and side markets are in equilibrium. The result is the anonymous equilibrium. The anonymous equilibrium results in a set of endogenous transfers and subsidies.
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