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Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

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  • Edward C Prescott
  • Robert M Townsend

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  • Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2069, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:2069
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon, Donald F, 1974. "A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 431-459, December.
    2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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