Group Characteristics Evolution Arising from Asymmetric Information
In asymmetric information problems, agents with less information (principals or contractors) usually take as given the preferences of agents with more information (agents or contractees). Moreover, the distribution of characteristics of contractees is supposed to be invariant. In this article we consider a mixed framework of asymmetric information (adverse selection followed by moral hazard) where those two assumptions are excluded. Specifically, the contractor only knows the current distribution of characteristics and the contractees may change them after signing the contract, if this improves their welfare. Thus, we find that the asymmetric information problem leads to a group effect (changes of characteristics). This feedback defines a sequence of temporary equilibria. We provide conditions for the convergence of that sequence to a stationary long run equilibrium. We also prove that both temporary equilibrium and long-run equilibrium coincide with the equilibrium in classical models of adverse selection and the moral hazard problem vanishes in the long-run..
Volume (Year): 13 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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