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La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information

  • Dionne, Georges

    (Service de L’enseignement de la finance, École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetrical information problems on resource allocation. Two problems are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection. One conclusion, shared by many authors, is that information problems introduce significant distortions in the economy. However, we can verify, in different markets, that efficient mechanisms have been introduced in order to reduce these distortions and even eliminate, at the margin, some residual information problems. This conclusion is stronger for adverse selection. One explanation is that adverse selection is related to exogenous characteristics while moral hazard is due to endogenous actions that may change at any point in time. Nous abordons la difficile question de la mesure empirique des effets des problèmes d’information sur l’allocation des ressources. Deux problèmes retiennent notre attention; le risque moral et l’antisélection. Une conclusion, acceptée par la plupart des auteurs, est que les problèmes d’information créent des distorsions importantes dans l’économie. Mais nous pouvons vérifier, dans certains marchés, que des mécanismes efficaces ont été mis en place pour réduire ces distorsions et même éliminer, à la marge, des problèmes résiduels d’information. Cette conclusion semble plus forte pour l’antisélection que pour le risque moral. Une explication est le fait que l’antisélection concerne des caractéristiques exogènes, alors que le risque moral est expliqué par des actions endogènes qui peuvent être modifiées en tout temps.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 74 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (décembre)
Pages: 585-606

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:74:y:1998:i:4:p:585-606
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