IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v76y1994i2p213-27.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health

Author

Listed:
  • Foster, Andrew D
  • Rosenzweig, Mark R

Abstract

Moral hazard plays a central role in many models depicting contractual relationships involving worker effort. The authors show how time-series information on worker health, consumption, and work time can be used to measure the effort effects of payment schemes. Estimates from longitudinal data describing farming rural households indicate that time-wage payment schemes and share-tenancy contracts reduce effort compared to piece-rate payment schemes and on-farm employment. The evidence also indicates, consistent with moral hazard, that the same workers consume more calories under a piece-rate payment scheme or in on-farm employment than when employed for time wages. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Foster, Andrew D & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 213-227, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:76:y:1994:i:2:p:213-27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535%28199405%2976%3A2%3C213%3AATFMHI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:76:y:1994:i:2:p:213-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kelly McDougall (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.