Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?
This paper examines how the Workers'Compensation (WC) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs interact to influence the duration of claims due to workplace accidents.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.|
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Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/
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- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988.
"Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard,"
Cahiers de recherche
8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie & Christine Laporte, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Workplace Accidents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 17-24, April.
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