Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?
This paper examines how the Workers'Compensation (WC) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs interact to influence the duration of claims due to workplace accidents.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
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- Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991.
"Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-244, May.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie & Christine Laporte, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Workplace Accidents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 17-24, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)