IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/gpprii/v23y1998i4p540-567.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After

Author

Listed:
  • Henri Loubergé

Abstract

The paper is written on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics, known as “The Geneva Association”. It reviews the evolution of insurance economics, by first recalling the situation in 1973, then presenting the developments and new approaches which flourished since then. The paper argues that these developments were only possible because steady advances were made in the economics of risk and uncertainty and in financial theory. Insurance economics has grown in importance to become a central theme in modern economics, providing not only practical examples to illustrate new theories, but also inspiring new ideas of relevance for the general economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:23:y:1998:i:4:p:540-567
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/gpp/journal/v23/n4/pdf/gpp199847a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/gpp/journal/v23/n4/full/gpp199847a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donald J. Meyer & Jack Meyer, 1998. "Changes in Background Risk and the Demand for Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(1), pages 29-40, June.
    2. Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-235, April.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1984. "Insurance and saving: some further results," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 101-110, April.
    4. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-1148, September.
    5. Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
    6. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1986. "Ownership structure and control : The mutualization of stock life insurance companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 73-98, May.
    7. Marie Allard & Jean-Paul Cresta & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Pooling and Separating Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection and Distribution Costs*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 103-120, December.
    8. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January.
    9. Richard Zeckhauser, 1995. "Insurance and catastrophes," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(2), pages 157-175, December.
    10. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    11. Doherty, Neil A & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1995. "Optimal Insurance without Expected Utility: The Dual Theory and the Linearity of Insurance Contracts," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 157-179, March.
    12. Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1985. "Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously," Cahiers de recherche 8559, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    13. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1983. "The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 304-311, April.
    14. Georges Dionne & Christian Gollier, 1992. "Comparative Statics Under Multiple Sources of Risk with Applications to Insurance Demand," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 17(1), pages 21-33, June.
    15. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(6), pages 1045-1054, December.
    16. repec:fth:geneec:99.01 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Eeckhoudt, Louis & Gollier, Christian & Schlesinger, Harris, 1991. "Increases in risk and deductible insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 435-440, December.
    18. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
    19. Garven, James R. & Louberge, Henri, 1996. "Reinsurance, Taxes, and Efficiency: A Contingent Claims Model of Insurance Market Equilibrium," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 74-93, January.
    20. Mark Pauly & Howard Kunreuther & Paul Kleindorfer, 1986. "Regulation and Quality Competition in the US Insurance Industry," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Jörg Finsinger & Mark V. Pauly (ed.), The Economics of Insurance Regulation, chapter 3, pages 65-107, Palgrave Macmillan.
    21. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    22. Cooper, Russell & Hayes, Beth, 1987. "Multi-period insurance contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 211-231.
    23. W. Kip Viscusi, 1995. "Insurance and catastrophes: The changing role of the liability system," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(2), pages 177-184, December.
    24. Briys, Eric P & Louberge, Henri, 1985. "On the Theory of Rational Insurance Purchasing: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(2), pages 577-581, June.
    25. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-387, May.
    26. Walter Kielholz & Alex Durrer, 1997. "Insurance Derivatives and Securitization: New Hedging Perspectives for the US Cat Insurance Market," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 22(1), pages 3-16, January.
    27. Hellwig, Martin F., 1988. "A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 154-163, October.
    28. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1978. "Risk Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments," Working Paper 302, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    29. Steinar Ekern & Svein-Arne Persson, 1996. "Exotic Unit-Linked Life Insurance Contracts," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 21(1), pages 35-63, June.
    30. Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
    31. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    32. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1986. "The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard," Working Paper 635, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    33. Cummins, J David, 1988. " Risk-Based Premiums for Insurance Guaranty Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(4), pages 823-839, September.
    34. Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, 1990. "Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 243-253.
    35. Kunreuther, Howard, 1996. "Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(2-3), pages 171-187, May.
    36. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
    37. Kihlstrom, Richard & Pauly, Mark, 1971. "The Role of Insurance in the Allocation of Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 371-379, May.
    38. Doherty, Neil A & Dionne, Georges, 1993. "Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract Structure and Organizational Form of Insurance Firms," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 187-203, April.
    39. Edi Karni, 1995. "Non-Expected Utility and The Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm: Discussion," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(1), pages 51-56, June.
    40. Kahane, Yehuda, 1977. "Capital adequacy and the regulation of financial intermediaries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 207-218, October.
    41. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    42. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
    43. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1989. "More on Insurance, Protection, and Risk," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 202-204, February.
    44. Gollier, Christian & Schlesinger, Harris, 1995. " Second-Best Insurance Contract Design in an Incomplete Market," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(1), pages 123-135, March.
    45. Segal, Uzi & Spivak, Avia, 1990. "First order versus second order risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 111-125, June.
    46. Marshall, John M, 1976. "Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 880-890, December.
    47. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 1993. "Self-Insurance and Self-Protection: A Nonexpected Utility Analysis," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 131-146, December.
    48. Georges Dionne & Pierre Lasserre, 1985. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 719-723.
    49. Luisa Tibiletti, 1995. "Beneficial changes in random variables via copulas: An application to insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(2), pages 191-202, December.
    50. Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli, 1998. "Background Uncertainty and the Demand for Insurance Against Insurable Risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(1), pages 7-27, June.
    51. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
    52. Doherty, Neil A & Garven, James R, 1986. "Price Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance: A Contingent-Claims Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(5), pages 1031-1050, December.
    53. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    54. Raymond D. Hill, 1979. "Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 172-191, Spring.
    55. Bond, Eric W & Crocker, Keith J, 1991. "Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 177-200, February.
    56. Dionne, Georges, 1984. "Search and Insurance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(2), pages 357-367, June.
    57. Ippolito, Richard A, 1979. "The Effects of Price Regulation in the Automobile Insurance Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 55-89, April.
    58. Priest, George L, 1996. "The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(2-3), pages 219-237, May.
    59. Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1983. "The Optimal Deductible for an Insurance Policy When Initial Wealth Is Random," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 555-565, October.
    60. Gollier Christian, 1995. "The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 522-535, August.
    61. Pedro Pita Barros, 1993. "Freedom of Services and Competition in Insurance Markets: A Note," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(1), pages 93-101, June.
    62. Doherty, Neil A. & Kang, Han Bin, 1988. "Interest rates and insurance price cycles," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 199-214, June.
    63. Hansmann, Henry, 1985. "The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 125-153, Spring.
    64. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    65. Henri Louberge & Evis Kellezi & Manfred Gilli, 1999. "Using Catastrophe-Linked Securities to Diversity Insurance Risk: A Financial Analysis of Cat Bonds," Journal of Insurance Issues, Western Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 125-146.
    66. Michaelsen, Jacob B. & Goshay, Robert C., 1967. "Portfolio Selection in Financial Intermediaries: A New Approach," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 166-199, June.
    67. Marc Chesney & Henri Loubergé, 1986. "Risk Aversion and the Composition of Wealth in the Demand for Full Insurance Coverage," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 359-370, September.
    68. Razin, Assaf, 1976. "Rational Insurance Purchasing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(1), pages 133-137, March.
    69. MOSSIN, Jan, 1968. "Aspects of rational insurance purchasing," LIDAM Reprints CORE 23, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    70. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 407-430.
    71. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    72. Machina, Mark J, 1982. ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 277-323, March.
    73. Kraus, Alan & Ross, Stephen A, 1982. "The Determination of Fair Profits for the Property-Liability Insurance Firm," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1015-1028, September.
    74. John Lintner, 1965. "Security Prices, Risk, And Maximal Gains From Diversification," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 587-615, December.
    75. Eeckhoudt, Louis & Gollier, Christian & Schlesinger, Harris, 1996. "Changes in Background Risk and Risk-Taking Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 683-689, May.
    76. D'Arcy, Stephen P & Doherty, Neil A, 1990. "Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 145-164, April.
    77. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
    78. Serge Magnan, 1995. "Catastrophe Insurance System in France," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 20(4), pages 474-480, October.
    79. Steven Shavell, 1982. "On Liability and Insurance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 120-132, Spring.
    80. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    81. Briys, Eric & Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1989. "More on Insurance as a Giffen Good," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 415-420, December.
    82. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    83. Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, 1980. "Solvency Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Empirical Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 261-279, Spring.
    84. Brennan, Michael J. & Schwartz, Eduardo S., 1976. "The pricing of equity-linked life insurance policies with an asset value guarantee," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 195-213, June.
    85. Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1997. "Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 73-79, December.
    86. William B. Fairley, 1979. "Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 192-210, Spring.
    87. Turnbull, S M, 1983. "Additional Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 217-229, April.
    88. Ross, Stephen A, 1981. "Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 621-638, May.
    89. William F. Sharpe, 1964. "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 425-442, September.
    90. Virginia R. Young & Mark J. Browne, 1997. "Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 22(2), pages 121-134, December.
    91. Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1996. "Extraction of Surplus under Adverse Selection: The Case of Insurance Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 234-239, April.
    92. J. David Cummins & Jack VanDerhei, 1979. "A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 709-719, Autumn.
    93. Doherty, N A & Tinic, S M, 1981. "Reinsurance under Conditions of Capital Market Equilibrium: A Note," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(4), pages 949-953, September.
    94. Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1983. "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts: Finite and Infinite Horizons," Cahiers de recherche 8326, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    95. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    96. Michael Hoy, 1982. "Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(2), pages 321-336.
    97. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    98. Paul L. Joskow, 1973. "Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 375-427, Autumn.
    99. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
    100. J. Aase Nielsen & Klaus Sandmann, 1996. "Uniqueness of the Fair Premium for Equity-Linked Life Insurance Contracts," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 21(1), pages 65-102, June.
    101. Christian Gollier & Patrick Scarmure, 1994. "The Spillover Effect of Compulsory Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 19(1), pages 23-34, June.
    102. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    103. Dahlby, B. G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, February.
    104. K. J. Arrow, 1964. "The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 91-96.
    105. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Romer, David & Williams, Steve, 1981. "Risk Aversion with Random Initial Wealth," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 911-920, June.
    106. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 279-279.
    107. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
    108. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
    109. Kunreuther, Howard & Pauly, Mark, 1985. "Market equilibrium with private knowledge : An insurance example," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 269-288, April.
    110. Gould, John P, 1969. "The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Selection of Optimal Deductibles for a Given Insurance Policy," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 143-151, April.
    111. Jack Meyer, 1992. "Beneficial Changes in Random Variables Under Multiple Sources of Risk and Their Comparative Statics*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 17(1), pages 7-19, June.
    112. Hoy, Michael & Robson, Arthur J., 1981. "Insurance as a Giffen good," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 47-51.
    113. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    114. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1981. "Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 407-434, July.
    115. Yang-Ming Chang & Issac Ehrlich, 1985. "Insurance, Protection from Risk, and Risk-bearing," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 574-586, August.
    116. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    117. Edward E. Schlee, 1995. "The Comparative Statics of Deductible Insurance in Expected- and Non-Expected-Utility Theories," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(1), pages 57-72, June.
    118. Peter Zweifel & Peter Ghermi, 1990. "Exclusive vs. Independent Agencies: A Comparison of Performance*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 15(2), pages 171-192, September.
    119. Eeckhoudt, Louis & Meyer, Jack & Ormiston, Michael B, 1997. "The Interaction between the Demands for Insurance and Insurable Assets," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 25-39, January.
    120. Gollier, Christian & Pratt, John W, 1996. "Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1109-1123, September.
    121. Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, 1990. "Competitive Allocations when the Asset Market is Incomplete," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 15(1), pages 5-16, March.
    122. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    123. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    124. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1982. "On the Corporate Demand for Insurance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 281-296, April.
    125. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 476-492, December.
    126. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1988. "Ownership Structure across Lines of Property-Casualty Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 351-378, October.
    127. Arthur J. Hosios & Michael Peters, 1989. "Repeated Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Limited Commitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 229-253.
    128. Mark J. Machina, 1995. "Non-Expected Utility and The Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 20(1), pages 9-50, June.
    129. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
    130. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
    131. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1990. "On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 19-40, January.
    132. F Fecher & S Perelman & P Pestieau, 1991. "Scale Economies and Performance in the French Insurance Industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 16(3), pages 315-326, July.
    133. Kahane, Yehuda & Kroll, Yoram, 1985. "Optimal insurance coverage in situations of pure and speculative risk and the risk-free asset," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 191-199, July.
    134. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    135. Neil A. Doherty & Hong Joo Jung, 1993. "Adverse Selection When Loss Severities Differ: First-Best and Costly Equilibria," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 173-182, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anatoliy Swishchuk, 2021. "Merton Investment Problems in Finance and Insurance for the Hawkes-Based Models," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-13, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    2. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
    4. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
    5. Jennifer L. Wang, 2004. "Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 7(1), pages 53-71, March.
    6. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    7. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
    8. Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1998. "The Causes and Consequences of Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance, pages 81-112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Larry A. Cox & Yanling Ge, 2004. "Temporal Profitability and Pricing of Long‐Term Care Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 677-705, December.
    10. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Dionne, Georges, 1981. "Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 57(2), pages 193-224, avril-jui.
    12. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    13. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    14. Christian Gollier & James Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, 2013. "Risk and choice: A research saga," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 129-145, October.
    15. Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    16. De Feo, Giuseppe & Hindriks, Jean, 2014. "Harmful competition in insurance markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 213-226.
    17. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
    18. Jennifer L. Wang & Ching‐Fan Chung & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 551-566, September.
    19. Jeffrey I. Bernstein, 1992. "Information Spillovers, Margins, Scale and Scope: With an Application to Canadian Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 3979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2005. "Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 8(2), pages 211-237, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:23:y:1998:i:4:p:540-567. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.