Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets
With asymmetric information, full commitment to long-term contracts may permit markets to approach first-best allocations. However, commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior, notably renegotiation. The authors reexamine commitment in insurance markets. They present an alternative model (which extends Jean-Jaques Laffont and Jean Tirole's procurement model to address uncertainty and competition), which involves semipooling in the first period followed by separation. This and competing models (e.g., single-period models and no-commitment models) have different predictions concerning temporal patterns of insurer profitability. A test using California data suggests that some automobile insurers use commitment to attract selective portfolios comprising disproportionate numbers of low risks. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.
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- Riley, John G, 1979.
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
- D'Arcy, Stephen P & Doherty, Neil A, 1990. "Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(2), pages 145-64, April.
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- Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M., 1990.
"Competitive Screening In Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract,"
Cahiers de recherche
9035, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 401-423.
- Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M., 1990. "Competitive Screening in Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract," Cahiers de recherche 9035, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Bolton, Patrick, 1990. "Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 303-310, May.
- Kunreuther, Howard & Pauly, Mark, 1985. "Market equilibrium with private knowledge : An insurance example," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 269-288, April.
- Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1983. "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts: Finite and Infinite Horizons," Cahiers de recherche 8326, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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