IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qed/wpaper/635.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Arnott
  • Joseph Stiglitz

Abstract

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies six types of market failure. Each of the subsequent sections focusses on a particular market failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1986. "The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard," Working Papers 635, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:635
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September.
    2. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-264.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Yun, Jungyoll, 2005. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2037-2067, December.
    2. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Dysfunctional Non-Market Institutions and the Market," NBER Working Papers 2666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Emmanuel Farhi & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 973-992.
    4. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(2), pages 487-534.
    5. Bas Jacobs, 2002. "An investigation of education finance reform; graduate taxes and income contingent loans in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 9, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    6. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism," Carleton Economic Papers 07-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2008.
    7. Gerda Dewit, 1998. "Risky Business: Intra-Firm Trade with Foreign Commercial Risk and Asymmetric Insurance," Working Papers 9808, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    8. Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 306-328, Summer.
    9. repec:eee:moneco:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:113-124 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Laurent Caussat & Michel Glaude, 1993. "Dépenses médicales et couverture sociale," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 265(1), pages 31-43.
    11. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1995. "Market failure with moral hazard and side trading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 159-184, October.
    12. Stefanescu, Razvan & Dumitriu, Ramona, 2015. "Alegerea soluţiilor pentru expunerile faţă de risc
      [Choosing solutions to risk exposures]
      ," MPRA Paper 65074, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Martinsson, Gustav, 2009. "Finance and R&D Investments - is there a debt overhang effect on R&D investments?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 174, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    14. Panagariya, Arvind, 2000. "Evaluating the case for export subsidies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2276, The World Bank.
    15. Arnott, Richard, 1987. "Essai sur le risque moral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 63(2), pages 74-97, juin et s.
    16. Martinsson, Gustav, 2009. "Are there Financial Constraints for Firms Investing in Skilled Employees?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 169, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    17. Stiglitz, J.E., 2015. "Devolution, independence, and the optimal provision of public goods," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 82-94.
    18. Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017. "Capital regulation and credit fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 113-124.
    19. Rössel, Jörg & Beckert, Jens, 2012. "Quality classifications in competition: Price formation in the German wine market," MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    20. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "The Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition," NBER Working Papers 5411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:635. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/qedquca.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.