IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v63y1996i1p83-102.html

Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets

Author

Listed:
  • Doherty, Neil A.
  • Thistle, Paul D.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:83-102
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047-2727(95)01568-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
    2. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1978. "Risk Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments," Working Paper 302, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    3. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1992. "The social value of hidden information in adverse selection economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 317-347, August.
    4. repec:bla:scandj:v:84:y:1982:i:3:p:421-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    7. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    8. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    9. Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-390, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ray Rees & Patricia Apps, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance markets, CHERE Working Paper 2006/3," Working Papers 2006/3, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney.
    2. Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2011. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches When Prevention Matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 23-46, February.
    3. Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schottmüller, 2018. "Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets: What Are the Welfare Effects?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(2), pages 465-502, April.
    4. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
    6. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
    7. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    8. Torben M. Andersen, 2024. "Hedging mortality risk over the life‐cycle—The role of information and borrowing constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(4), pages 1449-1466, October.
    9. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
    10. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
    11. David Crainich, 2025. "Optimal self‐insurance with genetic testing and state‐dependent utility," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 418-442, May.
    12. Banerjee, Anurag N. & Seccia, Giulio, 2002. "On the "Hirshleifer effect'' of unscheduled monetary policy announcements," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0213, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    13. Philip Bond & Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein, 2012. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 339-360, October.
    14. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    15. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    16. Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011. "Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1137, CIRPEE.
    17. Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, 1976. "The New Economics of Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 074, UCLA Department of Economics.
    18. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities," Working Papers 080908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    19. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2017. "The Revolution of Information Economics: The Past and the Future," NBER Working Papers 23780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. David Bardey & Philippe De Donder, 2025. "A welfare analysis of genetic testing in health insurance markets with adverse selection and prevention," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 443-483, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:83-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.