Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans
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- Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," Working Papers 14-4, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," Cahiers de recherche 1420, CIRPEE.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Alexander Nill & Gene Laczniak & Paul Thistle, 2019. "The Use of Genetic Testing Information in the Insurance Industry: An Ethical and Societal Analysis of Public Policy Options," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 105-121, April.
- David Crainich, 2025. "Optimal self‐insurance with genetic testing and state‐dependent utility," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 418-442, May.
- Bernard Salanié, 2017.
"Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(1), pages 1-14, March.
- Bernard Salanié, 2017. "Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(1), pages 1-14, March.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2017.
"Prevention incentives in long‐term insurance contracts,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 661-674, September.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2008. "Moral Hazard In Dynamic Insurance Classification Risk And Prepayment," Working Papers halshs-00340830, HAL.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2015. "Prevention Incentives in Long-Term Insurance Contracts," AMSE Working Papers 1541, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Oct 2015.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2015. "Prevention Incentives in Long-Term Insurance Contracts," Working Papers halshs-01214592, HAL.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2010. "The incentive for prevention in public health Systems," IDEP Working Papers 1001, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 17 Feb 2010.
- Renaud Bourlès, 2025. "Prevention incentives in long-term insurance contracts," Working Papers hal-01589993, HAL.
- Sylvestre Frezal & Laurence Barry, 2020. "Fairness in Uncertainty: Some Limits and Misinterpretations of Actuarial Fairness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 127-136, November.
- David A. Cather, 2020. "Reconsidering insurance discrimination and adverse selection in an era of data analytics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(3), pages 426-456, July.
- Hao, MingJie & Macdonald, Angus S. & Tapadar, Pradip & Thomas, R. Guy, 2018. "Insurance loss coverage and demand elasticities," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 15-25.
- Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
- Karlsson Linnér, Richard & Koellinger, Philipp D., 2022. "Genetic risk scores in life insurance underwriting," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- Alexander Braun & Niklas Haeusle & Paul Thistle, 2023. "Risk classification with on‐demand insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 90(4), pages 975-990, December.
- Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
- Meyer, Christina, 2022. "Geschlechtsspezifisches Altersvorsorgeverhalten – Untersuchungen mit dem deutschen Taxpayer-Panel," WISTA – Wirtschaft und Statistik, Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Wiesbaden, vol. 74(2), pages 30-41.
- M. Martin Boyer & Richard Peter, 2020. "Insurance Fraud in a Rothschild–Stiglitz World," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(1), pages 117-142, March.
- Gemmo, Irina & Browne, Mark J. & Gründl, Helmut, 2017. "Transparency aversion and insurance market equilibria," ICIR Working Paper Series 25/17, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
- Martin Eling & Irina Gemmo & Danjela Guxha & Hato Schmeiser, 2024. "Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 75-126, March.
- Irina Gemmo & Mark J. Browne & Helmut Gründl, 2025. "Privacy concerns in insurance markets: Implications for market equilibria and customer utility," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 484-514, May.
- Donatella Porrini, 2015. "Risk Classification Efficiency and the Insurance Market Regulation," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, September.
- Caliendo, Frank N. & Gorry, Aspen & Slavov, Sita, 2020.
"Survival ambiguity and welfare,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 20-42.
- Frank N. Caliendo & Aspen Gorry & Sita Slavov, 2017. "Survival Ambiguity and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 23648, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe & Mantilla, César, 2019.
"How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
- David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & CÔøΩsar Mantilla, 2017. "How Is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? Theory and Experiment," Documentos CEDE 15465, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Cesar Mantilla, 2017. "How is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing? Theory and Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 6402, CESifo.
- Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe & Mantilla, Cesar, 2017. "How Is the Trade-off between Adverse Selection and Discrimination Risk Affected by Genetic Testing?: Theory and Experiment," TSE Working Papers 17-777, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2019.
- Levon Barseghyan & Francesca Molinari & Darcy Steeg Morris & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2020. "The Cost of Legal Restrictions on Experience Rating," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 38-70, March.
- Torben M. Andersen, 2024. "Hedging mortality risk over the life‐cycle—The role of information and borrowing constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(4), pages 1449-1466, October.
- Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
- Martin Eling & Ruo Jia & Yi Yao, 2017.
"Between-Group Adverse Selection: Evidence From Group Critical Illness Insurance,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 771-809, June.
- Eling, Martin & Jia, Ruo & Yao, Yi, 2014. "Between-Group Adverse Selection: Evidence from Group Critical Illness Insurance," Working Papers on Finance 1403, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Oct 2014.
- Keith J. Crocker & Nan Zhu, 2021. "The efficiency of voluntary risk classification in insurance markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(2), pages 325-350, June.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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