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Geschlechtsspezifisches Altersvorsorgeverhalten – Untersuchungen mit dem deutschen Taxpayer-Panel

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  • Meyer, Christina

Abstract

Seit 2006 ist es bei der Kalkulation von Riester-Verträgen nicht mehr gestattet, das Geschlecht als Faktor in der Risikobewertung heranzuziehen. Das könnte dazu geführt haben, dass Verträge für Männer, die im Durchschnitt eine kürzere Lebenserwartung haben als Frauen, nach der Reform teurer wurden. In einem Difference-in-DifferencesModell mit Frauen als Kontrollgruppe wird auf Grundlage der Daten des deutschen Taxpayer-Panels untersucht, ob die Vertragsabschlussquote von Männern aufgrund der Unisex-Reform zurückgegangen ist. Zwar erschweren mögliche Antizipationseffekte eine kausale Interpretation, die Ergebnisse können jedoch als erste direkte Evidenz für ein Ausscheiden von Männern aus dem Riester-Markt aufgrund der Neuregelung gewertet werden. Dagegen scheint die Höhe der Förderquote die Reaktion nicht zu beeinflussen.

Suggested Citation

  • Meyer, Christina, 2022. "Geschlechtsspezifisches Altersvorsorgeverhalten – Untersuchungen mit dem deutschen Taxpayer-Panel," WISTA – Wirtschaft und Statistik, Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Wiesbaden, vol. 74(2), pages 30-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wistat:253429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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