Adverse selection in health insurance markets? Evidence from state small-group health insurance reforms
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- Monheit, Alan C. & Steinberg Schone, Barbara, 2004. "How has small group market reform affected employee health insurance coverage?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 237-254, January.
- Robert Kaestner & Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, 2002.
"Labor Market Consequences of State Health Insurance Regulation,"
Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 136-159, October.
- Robert Kaestner & Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, 2002. "Labor market consequences of state health insurance regulation," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 136-159, October.
- Thomas Buchmueller & John DiNardo, 1999.
"Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidencefrom New York, Pennsylvania and Connecticut,"
NBER Working Papers
6872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas Buchmueller & John Dinardo, 2002. "Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 280-294, March.
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