Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets - What Are the Welfare Effects?
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- Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2013. "Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9753, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Johan N.M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schotmüller, 2013.
"Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information,"
Discussion Papers
13-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2013. "Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywords
asymmetric information; information acquisition; insurance; screening; adverse selection;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2013-12-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-12-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-12-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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