Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information
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- Lagerlof, Johan & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2013. "Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
asymmetric information; information acquisition; insurance; screening; adverse selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2013-12-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-12-29 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2013-12-29 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-12-29 (Microeconomics)
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