IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v214y2023ics0022053123001424.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Signaling covertly acquired information

Author

Listed:
  • Ekmekci, Mehmet
  • Kos, Nenad

Abstract

We study the interplay between information acquisition and signaling. A sender decides whether to learn his type at a cost prior to taking a signaling action. A receiver observes the signaling action and responds. We characterize equilibria and apply a version of never a weak best response refinement in the environment where the information acquisition is observable as well as in the environment where it is covert. Covert information acquisition always leads to information acquisition when information is cheap. Observable information acquisition, on the other hand, does not necessarily.

Suggested Citation

  • Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:214:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001424
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105746
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001424
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105746?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signaling; Information acquisition; Refinements; NWBR;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:214:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.