Value of Information and Fairness Opinions in Takeovers
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Cited by:
- Dalkır, Elif, 2015. "Shareholder information and partial tender offers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 64-66.
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More about this item
Keywords
takeovers; fairness opinion; tender offers; lemons problem; large shareholder. jel classification numbers: d82; g34.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-04-11 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
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