Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling
The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each of these fields.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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