New and improved?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.002
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Cited by:
- Schmidbauer, Eric & Stock, Axel, 2018. "Quality signaling via strikethrough prices," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 524-532.
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Signaling; Innovation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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