Middlemen as Experts
I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also presented.
Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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