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The Optimal Choice of Pre-Launch Reviewer

  • David Gill
  • Daniel Sgroi

We develop a framework in which: (i) a firm can have a new product tested publicly before launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise fixed.� Price flexibility boosts the strong positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the strong negative impact of failing a soft test.� As a result, profits are convex in toughness: the firm selects either the toughest or softest test available.� The toughest test is optimal when consumers start with an unfavorable prior and receive sufficiently uninformative private signals (an "innovative" product); the softest test is optimal when signals are sufficiently informative.

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File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper562.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 562.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:562
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