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A Model of Forum Shopping

  • Josh Lerner
  • Jean Tirole

Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors of standards) resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users (buyers or adopters) of the worth of their property or idea. We analyze the sponsor?s choices of certifier and design, social preferences regarding these choices, and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users, of a downstream presence of the sponsor, and of certifier market power. Finally, we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas. (JEL D82, 031, 034)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.96.4.1091
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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 1091-1113

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1091-1113
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1091
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  10. An, Mark Yuying, 1998. "Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 350-369, June.
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