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The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: an Empirical Analysis

  • Chiao, Benjamin
  • Lerner, Josh
  • Tirole, Jean

This paper empirically explores standard-setting organizations’ policy choices. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2006), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 388.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Publication status: Published in The RAND Journal of Economics, vol.�38, n°4, 2007, p.�905-930.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:3675
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  1. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1988. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt08w115vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. William Lehr, 1996. "Compatibility Standards And Industry Competition: Two Case Studies," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 97-112.
  5. Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Certifying New Technologies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 734-744, 04/05.
  6. Marc Rysman & Tim Simcoe, 2005. "Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations," Working Papers 05-22, NET Institute, revised Oct 2005.
  7. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2006. "A Model of Forum Shopping," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1091-1113, September.
  8. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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