IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Licensing Policy And Technology Adoption In Standard Setting Organizations


  • Emanuele Tarantino


The standard setting organizations' decisions on licensing policy and standard's technological specification, and the ensuing implications for social welfare are analyzed. The author finds the conditions under which a licensing rule that grants monopoly power to the licensors whose technology is adopted in the standard can be employed by the members of the consortium (ex‐post licensing). Moreover, it is shown that the adoption of ex‐post licensing might lead to the inefficient exclusion of an efficient stand‐alone licensor. Finally, the author discusses the conditions under which a policy of ex‐ante licensing can be less efficient than ex‐post licensing. (JEL K21, L15, L24, L42)

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Licensing Policy And Technology Adoption In Standard Setting Organizations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 604-623, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:604-623
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12112

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2013. "How Does Downstream Firms' Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," ISER Discussion Paper 0878r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2015.
    2. repec:dpr:wpaper:0878 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:604-623. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.