Obtaining a Unique, Efficient Norm Through Negotiation by Linking Porposals
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|Date of creation:||Jan 2005|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2005|
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"Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation,"
345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998.
"Costly bargaining and renegotiation,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
3592, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1999. "Costly bargaining and renegotiation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9910, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 213, CESifo Group Munich.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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