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Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation

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  • Spagnolo, G.

Abstract

How many international agreements should there be, and who should sign them? When policy issues are separable, linking them in a ‘grand international agreement’ facilitates policy cooperation by reallocating slack enforcement power. When policy issues are substitutes, issue linkage further facilitates policy cooperation by increasing the amount of available enforcement power. The contrary happens when issues are complements. Then a better strategy can be to delegate policy issues to diferent independent national agencies. Constitutional rules that permit credible delegation to agents with dfferent objectives from governments facilitate international cooperation by generating stronger credible threats. Implications for multilateral agreements are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9913
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Böhringer & Jared C. Carbone & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2018. "Embodied Carbon Tariffs," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(1), pages 183-210, January.
    2. Currarini, S. & Marchiori, C., 2022. "Issue linkage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 16-40.
    3. Thomas Kuhn & Radomir Pestow & Anja Zenker, 2018. "Endogenous Climate Coalitions and Free Trade - Building the Missing Link," Chemnitz Economic Papers 018, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology.
    4. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 2009. "Pros and Cons of Linking Trade and Labor Standards," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Globalization And International Trade Policies, chapter 16, pages 599-621, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Nuno Limão, 2018. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 9, pages 257-281, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Drusilla K. Brown, 2001. "Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 89-112, Summer.
    7. Andriamananjara, Soamiely & Schiff, Maurice, 1998. "Regional groupings among microstates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1922, The World Bank.
    8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 519-562.
    9. Christoph Böhringer & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2017. "Paris after Trump: An Inconvenient Insight," CESifo Working Paper Series 6531, CESifo.
    10. Alexandre Sauquet, 2014. "Exploring the nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements: the case of the Kyoto Protocol," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 141-158, April.
    11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Thomas Kuhn & Radomir Pestow & Anja Zenker, 2019. "Building Climate Coalitions on Preferential Free Trade Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(2), pages 539-569, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International agreements; Policy cooperation; Policy coordination; Cross-border spillovers; International institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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