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Exploring the nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying international environmental agreements: the case of the Kyoto Protocol

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Listed author(s):
  • Alexandre Sauquet

    ()

Abstract

International environmental agreements require negotiation and cooperation among countries. This paper attempts to analyze the presence and nature of inter-country interactions in the process of ratifying such agreements. We develop a theoretical argument based on the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity and study the interactions among three different peer types: geographic neighbors, trading partners and green investment projects partners (in our case, clean development mechanism projects partners). We test for the presence of interactions by taking into account a temporal dimension, which constitutes a methodological contribution. To this end, we introduce spatially lagged endogenous variables into a parametric survival model and apply the proposed framework to the Kyoto Protocol ratification process. Our data sample covers 164 countries for the period 1998 to 2009. We find evidence that, while countries’ ratification decisions are basically strategic substitutes, they become strategic complements once we focus on the ratification decisions of specific peers. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-012-0033-y
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 159 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 141-158

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:141-158
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0033-y
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Kyoto protocol; Ratification; Strategic substitutes/complements; Spatial survival model; C41; F53; H41; Q53; Q56;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
  • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
  • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
  • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
  • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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Cited by:

  1. Garmann, Sebastian, 2014. "Do government ideology and fragmentation matter for reducing CO2-emissions? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-10.
  2. Antoine Cazals & Alexandre Sauquet, 2015. "How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 263-285, March.
  3. Alexandre SAUQUET & Antoine CAZALS, 2013. "When does cooperation win and why? Political cycles and participation in international environmental agreements," Working Papers 201320, CERDI.
  4. Amin, Ariane, 2016. "Exploring the role of economic incentives and spillover effects in biodiversity conservation policies in sub-Saharan Africa," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 185-191.
  5. Stefano Carattini & Simon Levin & Alessandro Tavoni, 2017. "Cooperation in the climate commons," GRI Working Papers 259, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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