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Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties

  • Andrew K. Rose
  • Mark M. Spiegel

We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such non-economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non-economic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas, and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international cross-holdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13988.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Publication status: published as Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2009. "Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 337-363, 03.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13988
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