Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or Symbionts?
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of offshore financial centers (OFCs). Since OFCs are likely to be tax havens and money launderers, they encourage bad behavior in source countries. Nevertheless, OFCs may also have unintended positive consequences for their neighbors, since they act as a competitive fringe for the domestic banking sector. We derive and simulate a model of a home country monopoly bank facing a representative competitive OFC which offers tax advantages attained by moving assets offshore at a cost that is increasing in distance between the OFC and the source. Our model predicts that proximity to an OFC is likely to have pro-competitive implications for the domestic banking sector, although the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. We test and confirm the predictions empirically. OFC proximity is associated with a more competitive domestic banking system and greater overall financial depth.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2006|
|Publication status:||published as Rose, Andrew and Mark Spiegel. “Offshore Financial Centers: Parasites or Symbionts?” Economic Journal 117, 523 (2007): 1310-1335.|
|Note:||IFM ME PR|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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